This paper has two goals. First, we develop frameworks for logical systems which are able to reflect not only nonmonotonic patterns of reasoning, but also paraconsistent reasoning. Our second goal is to have a better understanding of the conditions that a useful relation for nonmonotonic reasoning should satisfy. For this we consider a sequence of generalizations of the pioneering works of Gabbay, Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor and Makinson. These generalizations allow the use of monotonic nonclassical logics as the underlying logic upon which nonmonotonic reasoning may be based. Our sequence of frameworks culminates in what we call (following Lehmann) plausible, nonmonotonic, multiple-conclusion consequence relations (which are based on a given monotonic one). Our study yields intuitive justifications for conditions that have been proposed in previous frameworks and also clarifies the connections among some of these systems. In addition, we present a general method for constructing plausible nonmonotonic relations. This method is based on a multiple-valued semantics, and on Shoham's idea of preferential models. 1
Introduction
Nonmonotonicity is generally considered as a desirable property in commonsense reasoning; Many approaches to basic problems in artificial intelligence such as belief revision, database updating, and action planning, rely in one way or another on some form of nonmonotonic reasoning. This led to a wide study of general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning (see, e.g., [16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39] ). The basic idea behind most of these works is to classify nonmonotonic formalisms and to recognize several logical properties that nonmonotonic systems should satisfy.
The logic behind most of the systems which were proposed so far is supraclassical, i.e.: every first-degree inference rule that is classically sound remains valid in the resulting logics. As a result, the consequence relations introduced in these works are not paraconsistent [11] , that is: they are not capable of drawing conclusions from inconsistent theories in a nontrivial way. Moreover, the basic idea behind most of the nonmonotonic approaches is significantly different from the idea of paraconsistent reasoning: While the usual approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning rule out contradictions when a new data arrives in order to maintain the consistency of a knowledge-base, the paraconsistent approach to reasoning accepts knowledge-bases as they are, and tolerates contradictions in them, if such exist.
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, we want to develop frameworks for logical systems which will be able to reflect not only nonmonotonic patterns of reasoning, but also paraconsistent reasoning. Such systems will be useful also for reasoning with uncertainty, conflicts, and contradictions. Our second goal is to have a better understanding of the conditions that a plausible relation for nonmonotonic reasoning should satisfy. The choice of the various conditions that have been proposed in previous works seem to us to be a little bit ad-hoc, making one wonder why certain conditions were adopted while others (that might seem not less plausible) have been rejected. We would like to remedy this.
To achieve these goals, we consider a sequence of generalizations of the pioneering works of Gabbay [18] , Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor [24] , and Makinson [28] . These generalizations are based on the following ideas:
Each nonmonotonic logical system is based on some underlying monotonic one. The underlying monotonic logic should not necessarily be classical logic, but should be chosen according to the intended application. If, for example, inconsistent data is not to be totally rejected, then an underlying paraconsistent logic might be a better choice than classical logic. The more significant logical properties of the main connectives of the underlying monotonic logic, especially conjunction and disjunction (which have crucial roles in monotonic consequence relations), should be preserved as far as possible. On the other hand, the conditions that define a certain class of nonmonotonic systems should not assume anything concerning the language of the system (in particular, the existence of appropriate conjunction or disjunction should not be assumed).
The rest of this work is divided into two main sections. Section 2, the major one, is a study of nonmonotonic reasoning on the syntactical level. First we review the basic theory introduced in [24] (Section 2.1), which is based on a classical entailment relation and assumes the classical language. Then we consider nonmonotonic relations that are based on arbitrary entailment relations (Section 2.3). The next generalization (Section 2.4) uses Tarskian consequence relations [44] instead of just entailment relations. Finally, we consider multipleconclusion relations that are based on Scott consequence relations [37, 38] (Section 2.5). For defining the latter relations we indeed need not assume the availability of any specific connective in the underlying language. However, the hierarchy of relations which we consider is based first of all on the question: What properties of the conjunction and disjunction of the underlying monotonic logic are preserved in the nonmonotonic logic which is based on it. Our sequence of frameworks culminates in what we call (following [25] ) plausible nonmonotonic consequence relations. We believe that this notion captures the intuitive idea of "correct" nonmonotonic reasoning.
Section 3 provides a general semantical method for constructing plausible nonmonotonic consequence relations. This method is based on a combination of a lattice-valued semantics 2 with Shoham's idea of using only certain preferential models for drawing conclusions ( [40, 41] ). We show that some well-known plausible nonmonotonic logics can be constructed using this method. Most of these logics are paraconsistent as well (these include some logics that we have considered in previous works [2, 3, 5] ).
Preferential systems from an abstract point of view
In this section we investigate preferential reasoning from an abstract point of view. First we briefly review the original treatments of Makinson [28] and Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [24] . Then we consider several generalizations of this framework.
The standard basic theory -A general overview
The language that is considered in [24, 28] is based on the standard propositional one. Here, denotes the material implication (i.e., ¸ ) and denotes the corresponding equivalence operator (i.e., ´ ¸ µ ´ ¸ µ). The classical propositional language, with the connectives , , ,¸ , , and with a propositional constant Ø, is denoted here by ¦ Ð . An arbitrary language is denoted by ¦. Given a set of formulae in a language ¦, we denote by ´ µ the set of the atomic formulae that occur in , and by Ä´ µ the corresponding set of literals. The conditions above might look a little-bit ad-hoc. For example, one might ask why¸ is used on the right, while the stronger is on the left. A discussion and some justification appears in [24, 27] . 4 A stronger intuitive justification will be given below, using more general frameworks.
Generalizations
In the sequel we will consider several generalizations of the basic theory presented above:
1. In their formulation, [23, 24, 28, 29] consider the classical setting, i.e.: the basic language is that of the classical propositional calculus (¦ Ð ), and the basic entailment relation is the classical one ( Ð ). Our first generalization concerns with an abstraction of the syntactic components and the entailment relations involved: Instead of using the classical entailment relation Ð as the basis for definitions of cumulative nonmonotonic entailment relations, we allow the use of any entailment relation which satisfies certain minimal conditions. 2. The next generalization is to use Tarskian consequence relations instead of entailment relations (i.e. we consider the use of a set of premises rather than a single one). These consequence relations should satisfy some minimal conditions concerning the availability of certain connectives in their language. Accordingly, we consider cumulative and preferential nonmonotonic consequence relations that are based on those Tarskian consequence relations. 3. We further extend the class of Tarskian consequence relations on which nonmonotonic relations can be based by removing almost all the conditions on the language. The definition of the corresponding notions of a cumulative and a preferential nonmonotonic consequence relation is generalized accordingly. 4. Our final generalization is to allow relations with multiple conclusions rather than the single conclusion ones. Within this framework all the conditions on the language can be removed.
Entailment relations and cautious entailment relations
In what follows denote arbitrary formulae in a language ¦, and ¡ denote finite sets of formulae in ¦. Counter-examples will be given in Section 3 (see Proposition 3.24 and the note that follows it).
It is possible to strengthen the conditions in Definition 2.13 as follows:
Our next goal is to show that these stronger versions are really valid for any ½ -cumulative relation. Moreover, each property is in fact equivalent to the corresponding property under certain conditions, which are specified below. 
Tarskian consequence relations and Tarskian cautious consequence relations
The next step in our generalizations is to allow several premises on the l.h.s. of the consequence relations.
Definition 2.19
a) A (ordinary) Tarskian consequence relation [44] In what follows we assume that is a tcr and is a combining conjunction with respect to . 8 The prefix "T" denotes that these are Tarskian rules. 9 A set of conditions which is similar to the one below was first proposed in [19] , except that instead of cautious cut Gabbay uses cut. PROOF. All the parts of the claim are easily verified. We show parts (h) and (i) as examples:
Lemma 2.22 (Basic properties of and )
.
(i): By (b) we only need to show that´
. By Lemma 2.11, the note that follows it, and
Corollary 2.28 Suppose that is
is cumulative [preferential] in the sense of [24] 
(Definitions 2.1 and 2.2).
We next generalize the definition of a cumulative tccr to make it independent of the existence of any specific connective in the language. In particular, we do not want to assume anymore that a combining conjunction is available. 
PROOF. For the proof we need two simple claims: PROOF. If is a -cumulative tccr then by Proposition 2.29 and the fact that s-TR implies TR, it obviously has all the above properties. The converse follows from the fact that TRW and s-TR are equivalent in the presence of TR, TCC, and TLLE. The proof of this fact is similar to that of Proposition 2.17.
Scott consequence relations and Scott cautious consequence relations
The last generalization that we consider in this section concerns with consequence relations in which both the premises and the conclusions may contain more than one formula.
Definition 2.36
a) A Scott consequence relation [37, 38] 
Note Again, it can be easily seen that if is an scr then is an internal conjunction iff it is a combining conjunction, and similarly for . This, however, is not true in general.
A natural requirement from a Scott cumulative consequence relation is that its singleconclusion counterpart will be a Tarskian cumulative consequence relation. Such a relation should also use disjunction on the r.h.s. like it uses conjunction on the l.h.s. The following definition formalizes these requirements. 
Following the line of what we have done in the previous section, we next specify conditions that are equivalent to those of Definition 2.38, but are independent of the existence of any specific connective in the language. In particular, we do not want to assume anymore that a combining disjunction is available: 15 The subscripts "I" and "E" in the following rules stand for "Introduction" and "Elimination", respectively.
Corollary 2.47 If is an scr with a combining conjunction and is a -cumulative sccr, then is a combining conjunction and an internal conjunction w.r.t. .

PROOF. By Proposition 2.42(a), Corollary 2.44, and Proposition 2.46.
Next we consider the dual property, i.e.: conditions for assuring that a combining disjunction w.r.t. an scr will remain a combining disjunction w.r.t. a weakly -cumulative sccr . Our first observation is that one direction of the combining disjunction property for of yields monotonicity of : 
Definition 2.60 Let be an scr. A relation is called -plausible if it is a -preferential sccr and a plausibility logic.
A more concise characterization of a -plausible relation is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.61 Let be an scr. A relation is -plausible iff it satisfies Cum, CM, RM, and LCC
Ò℄ for every Ò. ¡. Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the various types of Scott relations considered in this section and their relative strengths. is assumed there to be an scr, and , are combining disjunction and conjunction (respectively) w.r.t. , whenever they are mentioned. 
A semantical point of view
In this section we present a general method of constructing nonmonotonic consequence relations of the strongest type considered in the previous section, i.e.: preferential and plausible sccrs. Our approach is based on a multiple-valued semantics. This will allow us to define in a natural way consequence relations that are not only nonmonotonic, but also paraconsistent (i.e.: capable of reasoning with inconsistency in a nontrivial way). A basic idea behind our method is that of using a set of preferential models for making inferences. Preferential models were introduced by McCarthy [30] and later by Shoham [40, 41] as a generalization of the notion of circumscription. The essential idea is that only a subset of models should be relevant for making inferences from a given theory. These models are the most preferred ones according to some conditions that can be specified syntactically by a set of (usually second-order) propositions, the satisfaction of which yields the exact kind of preference one wants to work with.
Here we choose the preferred models according to preference criteria, specified by preorders on the set of models of a given theory. The resulting consequence relations are shown to be plausible Scott relations. 
Multiple-valued models and Scott consequence relations
Definition 3.2 Let´Ä
Ëµ be a multiple-valued structure, and let be a set of formulae in a language ¦. 
c) A valuation is a model of (notation:
Ä ) if it satisfies every formula in . The set of the models of is denoted by ÑÓ ´ µ. 
Examples
Many well-known formalisms can be viewed as particular instances of the relation defined in 3.11. In this section we consider some of these formalisms.
In what follows we assume Ä to be a lattice and not only an arbitrary set of truth values. We further assume that the set of the designated values is a filter on Ä, and that Ë contains the basic lattice operations. The pair´Ä µ is sometimes called a logical lattice. 20 Note that in all the examples below the preferential systems under consideration are pointwise. Thus, by Theorem 3.17, the induced consequence relation is Ä -plausible. The following family of multiple-valued preferential systems is considered in [3, 5] . The algebraic structures that provide their semantics are sometimes called logical bilattices. Bilattices were introduced by Ginsberg in [20, 21] as a general framework for a diversity of applications in AI (see also [1, 2, 8, 13, 14] 23 Note that the interpretation of and are determined by Ø , while is defined using .
Ä . Similarly, it is possible to define a -meet operation on Ä and by Corollary 3.17, the corresponding connective, ª, is also an internal conjunction and a combining conjunction w.r.t. Ä . By the same corollary, the connectives and¨, which respectively correspond to the the Ø -join and to the -join on Ä, are internal disjunctions w.r. [42, 43] . See [2] for a discussion on the similarities and the differences between Ä Á and ¡ . 26 In [2, 3] this preferential system is defined in a somewhat different way. We omit the details here. 27 Note, however, that the three-valued structure is not a bilattice, but what is sometime called pseudo lower-bilattice [17] .
Conclusion and further work
In this work we have studied logical approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, based on the notion of a nonmonotonic consequence relation. We considered a sequence of generalizations of the works of Gabbay [18, 19] , Makinson [28] , and Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor [24] . These generalizations allow the use of monotonic nonclassical logics as the underlying logic upon which nonmonotonic reasoning may be based. We have found that multiple conclusion consequence relations are the best framework for defining plausible nonmonotonic systems. Our study yields intuitive justifications for the rules of the nonmonotonic systems mentioned above. It also clarifies the connections among some of these systems. For instance, it relates the work in [24] to that of [25] .
We have also presented a general method for constructing plausible nonmonotonic relations. This method is based on a multiple-valued semantics, and on Shoham's idea of preferential models. It allows us to define in a uniform way consequence relations that are not only nonmonotonic, but also paraconsistent.
The question whether this semantical approach also characterizes nonmonotonic plausible consequence relations is still open. Formally, is it true that for every scr and a -plausible sccr there is a multiple-valued structure´Ä Ëµ and a (pointwise?) preferential system È ´Î Ä µ such that for every sets of formulae ¡ in a language ¦ we have that ¡ iff Ä ¡. This is a matter for a further research.
